"Interesting and important. Dempsey presents a wealth of original survey data on the views of army personnel. He shows that soldiers hold views that are not dramatically different from those of the American people as a whole, but that differences between officers and the general public exist on many issues. Dempsey points to the dangers of having the military aligned to one political party."--Ole R. Holsti, professor emeritus, Duke University

"This is the only analysis of a random-sample survey of the U.S. Army that probes in some depth the political attitudes of army personnel. Dempsey shows that the army as a whole is more conservative and Republican than comparable civilian cohorts but, because of the large number of African Americans and a blue-collar enlisted ranks, is not overwhelmingly conservative and Republican. This is a valuable book with one-of-a-kind data that will be a great resource and stimulus for research and debate."--Peter D. Feaver, coauthor of Paying the Human Costs of War

OUR ARMY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Chapter One

Americans are well aware of the example George Washington set for the relationship between the fledgling American state and its military. The image of Washington as victorious military commander grandly announcing his retirement and abruptly departing Annapolis by horse, thereby forgoing any Napoleonic aspirations to power, is indelibly inked in the American psyche. The idea that the uniformed hero would ride away from the army he almost single-handedly maintained and led through the Revolution, his army, to return to his home on Mount Vernon, voluntarily relinquishing a very good chance of becoming America's first monarch, was a stunning precedent in American civil-military relations. In this, Washington emulated Cincinnatus and demonstrated how members of the armed forces in America should not attempt to directly translate military power into domestic political power.

Despite his refusal to assume power on the basis of his military position, Washington became America's first president-due in no small part to his military service. The prestige that Washington had gained through his sacrifice during the Revolution was a valuable asset for those trying to determine the course of the new nation. Planning for the Constitutional Convention, Henry Knox and James Madison worked diligently to secure his attendance to lend legitimacy to the idea of a major transformation of government. Washington ultimately agreed and served as the president of the convention. This allowed him to remain above the debate and made him a natural choice for the newly created position of president. Washington thereby set the first example of how military service could still be a valuable asset for elected public office without violating the premise of civilian supremacy.

Since the time of Washington's successful transition from military commander to president, more than a few men (and, increasingly, women) with military experience have attempted to translate their service into political power. And a greater number without a background of military service have tried to draw upon the support of members of the military as a political asset. In recent years, these efforts have become more acute. As the stature of the military rises, so does its appeal as a political force. However, this basic relationship represents a paradox.

The reputation of the military has steadily increased since the late 1970s. Today a higher percentage of people state that they have "a great deal of confidence" in the military than they do in medicine, religion, the press, or Congress. Much of this gain in prestige has come from the army's performance on the battlefield, as in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, and the rally effect of the attacks on the United States in 2001. But aside from these spikes in confidence during and after armed conflict, there has been a steady increase, which many attribute to the growing professionalism of the American military since the advent of the all-volunteer force. There are many dimensions to military professionalism, but one key aspect has been the apolitical nature of military service.

Military service is fundamentally about protecting the state-not just a fraction of the state. Military sacrifice is implicitly for the greater good and has never been conceptualized as sacrifice for a specific political agenda. This dynamic of representing collective interests over specific interests is among the reasons that people often have more confidence in the presidency than they do in Congress. If we take the example further, we note that the judiciary generally ranks higher than both the presidency and Congress due to its perceived position "above the fray" of most political squabbles, and the military typically ranks above all three branches of government. A significant portion of the military's prestige comes from its reputation as one of the most apolitical American institutions.

And thus the paradox of prestige. The more members of the military build a reputation for apolitical service to the country the greater a political prize the military becomes. As the military gains in prestige, the political backing of members of the military, either implicit or explicit, becomes an advantage in electoral politics. In the view of political operatives, the military is therefore a valuable "prestige vote" whose capture translates into much more than the actual votes of members of the military.

The 2004 election highlighted how central military service and the political preferences of the military can be to political campaigns. Against the backdrop of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military service of both presidential candidates was a major component of each campaign. Both candidates aggressively sought to win the votes of military personnel and their family members. Each candidate invited retired generals to speak on his behalf during the campaign and at the nominating conventions. At times it seemed as if a virtual arms race had been initiated as both parties sought retired members of the armed forces to sit onstage behind their candidate.

A decisive moment in this struggle involved retired General Tommy Franks. Fresh out of uniform as the combatant commander for the geographic region covering Afghanistan and Iraq, Franks stepped onto the stage of the Republican National Convention and endorsed George W. Bush for president. This was notable because his endorsement appeared explicitly designed to highlight the apolitical nature of military service and, by extension, the "purity" of Franks's endorsement of Bush. Franks began his speech by noting, "I'm not a Republican. I'm not a Democrat. But I believe in democracy. I believe in America. After almost four decades as a Soldier I've been Independent. But, here I stand tonight, endorsing George W. Bush." He then spent the remainder of his speech talking about war, ending with a reference to George W. Bush not as president but as "Commander-in-Chief." In doing so, Franks translated the reputation of the military for apolitical service into a strong endorsement of the Republican candidate for president.

This dramatic endorsement from a newly retired general and the steady drumbeat of debates over the meaning of military service and attitudes of service members spurred survey researchers to take notice. Unfortunately, there was a dearth of information about the general public's attitudes toward military issues and an almost complete absence of surveys of military personnel. Survey questions about military service largely vanished with the end of the draft in 1973, and comprehensive data on the social and political attitudes of active-duty members of the military were virtually nonexistent. As late as 2000, many surveys omitted military installations from their sampling procedures. In 2004 survey researchers scrambled to fill the gap.

The most notable of these efforts were made by the Annenberg Public Policy Center and the Military Times Media Group. Using their extensive database of respondents contacted for the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), the Annenberg Center conducted a special survey of 656 households with an active-duty service member. The Military Times newspapers capitalized on a series of surveys begun in 2003 which utilized their subscriber rolls to identify and survey members of the military. For the 2004 election they were able to survey 1,498 of their subscribers who were also active service members.

These polls from the Annenberg Center and Military Times Company reported significant support for the incumbent Bush and high rates of Republican Party affiliation among members of the military. Of the 372 respondents in the Annenberg Center survey who were members of the military, 47% identified themselves as Republicans and 15% identified themselves as Democrats. The Military Times Company reported that 60% of their respondents described themselves as Republican and only 13% identified themselves as Democrats. Seventy percent of their respondents approved of the job being done by President Bush. These findings were well publicized but did not cause a significant stir, as they appeared to confirm the findings of a study conducted in 1998 and 1999 by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS).

The TISS project was an attempt to assess whether an attitudinal "gap" existed between the military and civilian populations. The authors of the TISS study were interested in the attitudes of military elites and limited their analysis to midlevel and senior-level officers who were currently attending professional military schooling. The surveys did not include junior officers or the enlisted ranks. However, the study was the most comprehensive analysis of the attitudes of senior military leaders to date, with 723 active-duty service members included in their surveys. The findings of the TISS study appeared to confirm widespread anecdotal evidence that the military had become overwhelmingly Republican, with 64% of officers in the survey choosing to identify with that party. Only 8% identified themselves as Democrats. Although the TISS study is very useful as a starting point for quantifying the gap between the military and society, the project's focus on senior military leaders meant that the TISS survey sample represented only about 6% of the army.

While each of these studies made valuable contributions to our understanding of the social and political attitudes of the military, many questions remain. This book seeks to fill the gap in our understanding of the active military population by examining one branch of service, the army, in detail. Focusing on one branch of service allows for the first in-depth look at the attitudes of enlisted personnel as well as a careful analysis of various subgroups within the service, such as junior officers, women, and racial and ethnic minorities. This analysis is made possible by the first and only random-sample survey of the army that addresses the social and political attitudes of active service members.

Citizenship and Service: A 2004 Survey of Army Personnel

The Citizenship and Service Survey (hereafter C&S Survey) was designed to collect data on each respondent's (1) general attitudes toward the army, including morale, career intentions, and opinions about army leadership; (2) reasons for joining the army; (3) personal attitudes toward social issues and political issues, including foreign policy; and (4) experiences of discrimination and opinions concerning gender and racial and ethnic relations in the army and civilian society. Wherever useful and possible, the survey replicated questions in existing American national surveys to allow for comparisons with the civilian population.

In addition to gathering this baseline information on attitudes, the survey included extensive demographic information. Survey questions concerning respondents' demographic characteristics focused on data that the army had not normally collected. These included questions on language proficiency, the military service of family members, and the immigration status of the soldiers' parents and grandparents.

Every soldier and officer on active duty whose name was in the army's personnel database as of February 2004 was eligible for inclusion in the survey, with the exception of personnel deployed in combat zones; those in units deploying to and from Iraq and Afghanistan during the months of April and May 2004; and soldiers and officers in a few select ranks. Due to the high turnover and sustained deployment of forces into Iraq and Afghanistan, the exclusion of soldiers currently in a combat zone did not prevent combat veterans from being included. A large number of respondents (375, or 32% of the sample) were veterans of either Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-4) or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-4); and 143 indicated that they had been involved in direct ground combat in the previous two years.

The survey excluded sergeants major and generals due to the small population size of these ranks and the high visibility of generals. The survey also excluded the lowest two enlisted ranks, private E1 (PV1) and private E2 (PV2), because of the very high mobility of these soldiers. Soldiers entering the army generally serve in these ranks for less than a year, spending the majority of their time in basic and advanced individual training before arriving at their first regular unit. The soldiers and officers in the four rank categories just cited make up approximately 10% of the army on active duty, which left 90% of the army population, by rank, eligible to be included in the survey.

The design of the survey sample focused on the dimensions of race and rank and included oversamples of certain groups based on projected return rates. Specifically, the sample included additional white, black, and Hispanic officers as well as additional black and Hispanic enlisted soldiers in an attempt to get close to two hundred respondents in each category. In the end, responses from the basic sample plus the oversample, taken together, yielded a final sample size for analysis of 1,188, including responses from 563 enlisted men and women, 90 warrant officers, and 535 officers. The composition of the final sample, broken down by rank, gender, and race and ethnicity, is shown in table 1.1.

The survey was conducted primarily via mail questionnaires between April 3 and July 24, 2004. Each respondent received an introductory letter that was followed, in sequence, by the primary survey mailing, a reminder postcard, and then a second survey mailing. The last contact was a fifth letter offering respondents the option of completing the survey online. The response rate for the survey was 45% among those soldiers and officers whose mail was not returned as undeliverable. All reported data in this book are weighted to reflect the army population on the dimensions of race, rank, and gender, except where noted.

In sum, the C&S Survey provides a baseline and comprehensive view of social and political attitudes across one branch of military service, the army. This baseline allows for the examination and testing of previous findings based on anecdotal or incomplete evidence. By closely examining the possible determinants of these attitudes and the role of the military in shaping political views it also allows for a clearer picture to emerge of how members of the military form their political views.

The 2004 West Point Preelection Survey

Although the bulk of the analysis in this book focuses on the attitudes of members of the active-duty army, these findings are augmented in chapter 8 with the results of a survey of West Point cadets conducted on the eve of the 2004 election. Data from this survey provide another angle from which we can explore the reason for any differences between soldiers and officers. By examining future officers in precommissioning training, the survey also provides a window into the way the army may or may not socialize its future leaders.

The cadet survey was designed using the C&S survey as a guide and covered many of the same topics. The survey also included questions that might inform the way the political and social attitudes of future officers develop. These included questions on the military service of family members, the political affiliations of family members, and the socioeconomic status of cadets' families. The survey also explored the extent to which cadets feel pressure to identify with either of the two major political parties.

The survey was administered through a secure Web site from Saturday, October 30, until 5 p.m. on Tuesday, November 2 (Election Day). Responses to the survey yielded a final sample size for analysis of 885, including responses from 738 men and 129 women. The survey response rate was 54 percent. The survey methodology is discussed in more detail in chapter 8.

This study uses the results of both the cadet survey and the C&S Survey in an attempt to answer the following specific research questions:

1. To what degree is the army different from the American public in terms of political participation and political and social attitudes? 2. What role do demographic differences play in explaining any attitudinal differences? 3. How do soldiers and officers differ in their social and political views, and why? 4. What role does self-selection play in explaining the attitudes of those who join an all-volunteer army? 5. Are civilian perceptions of military attitudes accurate? Is the military rightly perceived as a conservative and predominantly Republican institution? 6. What are the implications of the answers to these questions for civilmilitary relations?

(Continues...)

Excerpted from OUR ARMYby Jason K. Dempsey Copyright © 2010 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
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